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Recent  empirical  research  has  shown  that,  from  deal  to  deal,  serial  acquirers'  cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are declining. This has been most often attributed to CEOs hubris. We 
question this interpretation. Our theoretical analysis shows that (i) a declining CAR from deal to 
deal is not sufficient to reveal the presence of hubris, (ii) if CEOs are learning, economically 
motivated and rational, a declining CAR from deal to deal should be observed, (iii) predictions 
can be derived about the impact of learning and hubris on the time between successive deals 
and, finally, (iv) predictions about the CAR and about the time between successive deal trends 
lead to testable empirical hypotheses. 
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For more than twenty years, an intensive debate has ensued about acquirers’ motivations in 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). This is most likely due to early empirical results showing that 
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date are at best equal to 
zero  or,  worse,  even  negative  (Jensen  and  Ruback,  1983).  Why  would  firms  undertake 
acquisitions if not to create value? Several arguments have been proposed in the literature to 
explain this puzzling result including the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986).
1 Recent contributions 
help to resolve this puzzle to some extent. In particular, Moeller  et al. (2004) by extending the 
analysis to a much larger sample of deals (more than 10,000), find clear evidence of a size effect: 
on average, acquirers’ CAR are positive and significant (around 1.5%) but, the larger the deal, the 
smaller (or more negative) the CAR becomes. Early studies, focusing only on large deals between 
listed companies, were affected from a sample selection bias. 
However recent empirical studies raise a new, and perhaps even more challenging, puzzle: 
the CARs of serial acquirers are declining from deal to deal (e.g., Fuller et al., 2002; Billett and 
Qian, 2005; Conn et al., 2005; Croci, 2005; Ismail, 2006; Ahern, 2006)
2. In most of the quoted 
references, the downward trend in CAR is interpreted as a clear evidence of hubris or of its 
development across the deal sequence (an exception is Ahern (2006)). Even if at first sight, the 
hubris argument appears appealing, this explanation is questionable within the framework of Roll 
(1986). Hubris, as defined originally, should be empirically ass ociated with ex-post observable 
                                                        
1 Without being exhaustive, other arguments put forward are the acquisition program effect (Schipper and 
Thompson, 1983;  Malatesta  and  Thompson,  1985), the  free  cash-flow  theory  and the  empire  building 
motivation (Jensen, 1986). 
2 We provide detailed figures in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 4 
 
overbidding and a significant probability of negative CAR. However, the above quoted papers 
report either significant positive or insignificant CAR across the deal sequence.
3  
Moreover, the hubris explanation is in sharp contrast with the claims of both the management 
literature and consulting firms. The management literature suggests that acquirers have a great 
potential to learn from experience (Hayward, 2002; Harding and Rovit, 2004). The professional 
press and consulting  firms also emphasize that successful frequent acquirers are on a learning 
curve: “They often start with small, lower-risk deals and build capabilities in deal making. They 
institutionalize the processes and create a feedback loop to learn from mistakes” (Rovit et al., 
2003). But how could declining acquirer CAR be consistent with any form of learning?  
The above question is quite important. Indeed, if hubris really does explain the declining 
trend of CARs, concerns must be raised about both the selection process of CEOs and about 
corporate  governance  mechanisms.  We  propose  an  alternative  and  perhaps  more  palatable 
explanation. Our intuition is the following: if acquirers are learning, they improve their target 
selection  and  integration  processing  abilities  from  deal  to  deal.  The  risk  associated  with 
acquisitions decreases. As CEOs are risk averse, their bidding aggressiveness increases. They win 
the auction contests more often but the ex-post observed price paid also increases. The fraction of 
wealth retained by acquiring shareholders decreases, explaining the declining trend in CAR.  
The learning and hubris based interpretation of the declining CAR trend rests on the central 
role of CEOs in the acquisition decision process. Personal characteristics of CEOs are indeed 
known  to  influence  the  managing  style  of  firms  (Bertrand  and  Schoar,  2003)  and  this  is 
particularly  true  for  large  investment  decisions  such  as  M&As.  Even  if  smaller  deals  are 
supervised  by  low-level  executives,  hubris  and/or  learning  could  still  affect  behavior.  So,  to 
                                                        
3 A notable exception is Billet and Qian (2005), where the authors, focusing only on large (over than 100 
millions USD) M&As between listed companies, report significant negative abnormal returns for the 
acquirers across the deal sequence. 5 
 
develop a theory of the CAR’s pattern from deal to deal, we focus on decision maker’s behavior. 
For convenience we refer to the decision maker as the CEO and it could actually be the CEO 
himself (for large deals), or the CFO (for intermediate deals) or some lower ranking executive 
(for small deals). 
To better understand the CAR pattern from deal to deal, we develop a formal model of the 
CEO decision process and explore its consequences on observable bids, prices, the time between 
successive deals (TBD), and the CAR. Our main results are such as follow: 
(i)  a  CAR  declining  trend  should  be  observed  for  rational
4  and economically motivated 
CEOs that learn from deal to deal. Learning enables the CEO to develop more precise 
valuations of successive targets; i.e., they become sequentially less risky, ceteris paribus. 
Taking  into  account  CEO  risk  aversion,  for  a  given  level  of  expected  value,  this 
uncertainty reduction increases target valuation. This translates into higher bids, prices 
and,  therefore  a  higher  fraction  of  the  wealth  creation  transferred  to  the  target 
shareholders.  This  process  generates  a  declining  acquirer  CAR  trend  during  M&A 
programs. In short, the lower the valuation risk, the higher the price the CEO is willing to 
pay.  
(ii)  learning also has implications for the TBD. Taking into consideration that the CEO risk-
adjusted valuation increases with learning (for a given level of expected value) and that 
the CEO bidding function (under quite general assumptions) is strictly increasing in his 
valuation, the probability that the CEO will win the auction also increases from deal 
attempt to deal attempt. Learning should lead therefore to a decreasing TBD. 
These results indicate that a declining CAR trend is NOT necessarily due to hubris; it is also 
compatible  with learning.  As it is also pointed  out in Conn  et al. (2005) or Ahern (2006), a 
                                                        
4 By a rational CEO, we mean a utility maximizing agent making decision on the basis of unbiased beliefs 
(see Section 1). 6 
 
declining CAR trend is in fact not specific to any given assumption. It could be due to hubris, to 
learning  but  also  to  a  time-varying  investment  opportunity  set  (Klasa  and  Stegemoller 
(forthcoming)), budget constrained acquirers picking first good targets, or some form of mean 
reversion. Our model delivers however predictions not only about the CAR trend but also about 
the TBD. This allows us to derive implications that are more specific to the learning hypotheses 
and,  therefore,  open  the  door  to  empirical  tests  of  the  presence  of  learning  in  acquisition 
programs. 
This paper is organized in 4 sections. The first section is dedicated to the study of the CEO’s 
valuation of the target.  Section 2 explores the CEO’s bidding behavior and its implications for 
the price determination process. Section 3 is devoted to the formulation of empirical predictions. 
The final section summarizes and concludes. 
1. The Acquiring CEO’s Valuation 
We first model the CEO’s valuation process. Define the acquiring CEO’s valuation of the 
target as the maximum price he is willing to pay for the target; (at any higher price, acquiring the 
target would negatively affect his current utility). We denote the CEO’s target valuation v. For a 
risk averse CEO, this represents his certainty-equivalent. The CEO’s valuation is the initial stage 
of the acquisition process. At this stage, potential competition is exogenous. The CEO has some 
perception of the potential behavior of competitors, once the acquisition attempt becomes public. 
The  interaction  between  CEO  bidding  and  competitors  at  a  second  stage  will  be  explicitly 
analyzed  in  an  auction  based  setup  in  Section  2.    To  avoid  the  analytic  difficulty  of  target 
“picking” due to either limited funds or a redued opportunity set, we also assume that the CEO 





1.1 Target Value and Expected Synergies 
In contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), we assume that the capital markets are efficient in 
the sense that the market price is an unbiased estimate of the target firms’ true economic value as 
a stand alone venture.  Hence, acquisitions are not motivated by under-evaluation.   Denote the 
target’s  market  value  T MV
5.  The  synergy  potentially  created  by  the  merger  is  not  perfectly 
known to the acquirer.  It is a random variable (denoted  t s ~ ) and is defined as a proportion of 
T MV . It includes all direct and indirect effects of the merger decision (e.g., the potential impact 
of this specific merger on the future continuation of the M&A program). The target’s market 
value in a completed acquisition becomes: 
) t s ~ 1 ( T MV n acquisitio T MV   .        (1) 
Following the auction literature,  t s ~  must be understood as a private value to the acquirer and 
does not depend on the valuations of other potential acquirers. This implies that our setup applies 
more  to  strategic  than  financial  acquisitions  (see  Bullow et  al.  (1999)).  We  assume  that  t s ~  
follows a Gaussian distribution  ) , (
2
s s N    where  s   and 
2
s   are respectively the  expected 
synergy  and  the  variance  of  the  synergy.
6  However, the CEO has limited   information and 
perceives ) ˆ , (
2
,t s s N     at  deal  t,  where
2
, ˆ t s  represents  the  CEO  perception  of  the  uncertainty 
                                                        
5 A summary of notations is provided in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 
 
6Since the distribution of  t s ~  is unbounded, this specification conceivably allows a negative market value. In 
the On-Line Appendix to this paper, we present an alternative specification, in which the market value of 
the  target,  conditional  on a  successful  acquisition,  is  t s
T e MV
~
 with  t s ~  normally  distributed.  Using the 
properties of the log-normal distribution, explicit solutions can be obtained but they are algebraically more 
messy and offer no additional insights. 8 
 
associated with synergy at that time. We use ~ to indicate a random variable and ^ to indicate that 
a perception as opposed to a true parameter. Imperfect knowledge means that s t s   
2
, ˆ .  
Two comments are worthwhile at this stage: 
-  the CEO is assumed to have unbiased anticipations (he knows  s  ). This might appear 
unrealistic but it allows us to draw a clear distinction between rational CEOs and hubris 
infected CEOs (which will be analyzed in Section 3.3.) Hubris infected CEOs can indeed 
be characterized by biased priors. 
-  s   is constant from deal to deal. This enables us to keep the investment opportunity set 
constant.  Our objective is to isolate the effects of simple learning on CEO behavior and 
an evolving investment opportunity set would bring irrelevant complications.  
 
1.2 Learning 
Since firms (and their CEOs) often undertake acquisition programs (Schipper and Thompson, 
1983; Malatesta and Thompson, 1985; Fuller et al., 2002) it seems reasonable that they should 
learn  from  each  completed  deal.  We  introduce  learning  explicitly  in  the  form  of  a  Bayesian 
updating process from deal to deal.  Market reactions to each deal’s announcement represent 
signals sent to the CEO about potential synergies, denoted  t  ~ . They are assumed to be unbiased 
and follow a Gaussian distribution  ) , (
2
  s N , where 
2
   captures the precision of signals sent 
by the market (or the market’s informativeness).
7   
Concerns could be raised about how reactions around past deal provide any information at all 
about a current deal attempt. This interesting question is studied by Hayward (2002). The author 
focuses on conditions that permit organizational learning to take place during serial acquisitions.    
                                                        
7 The unbiased signal distribution is consistent with efficient markets. 9 
 
We assume that these conditions are fulfilled and that learning is possible. Using the Bayesian 
conjugate prior, the CEO posterior estimates of  t s, ˆ   and 
2




























































































   
   t
s t s
,    (3) 
where  ) ˆ , (
2
0 , s s N    is the CEO prior  and (t-1) is the number of prior deals completed by the 
CEO.  This  setup  could  be  extended  to  accommodate  signals  sent  by  rival  acquirers  without 
changing the nature of the argument. 
For a CEO with unbiased anticipations, when the market is efficient and delivers signals 
centered on the population parameter, Equation (2) shows that the perception of the expected 
synergy is simply the population value. The variance of the posterior distribution in Equation (3) 
depends on the precision of the information sent to the CEO (the inverse of the signal variance 
2
  ). Note that as 
2
   grows, the signal precision falls and there  is a smaller revision in the 
posterior  precision;  indeed,  if  the  signal  is  totally  non -informative,  the  posterior  precision  is 
unaltered  from  the  prior.    Also,  for  positive  and  finite  values  of 
2
  ,  the  posterior  precision 
becomes  monotonically  smaller  with  the  number  of  deals;  asymptotically,  the  CEO  learns 
perfectly about the synergy in prospective acquisitions.   
 
1.3 The CEO’s Decision Problem 
Assumptions. To estimate the target valuation that maximizes his own expected utility, the 
CEO will take into account both the probability of the takeover being successful (defeating the 10 
 
best  competitor’s  offer)  and  the  probability  of  being  penalized  ex-post,  due  to  disappointing 
realized synergies with respect to the acquisition price. As shown in Mitchell and Lehn (1990) 
and Lehn and Zhao (2006), potential dismissal is a real risk in practice.  We model the CEO’s 
decision problem while assuming: 
-  Bids and prices are strictly increasing in the CEO’s valuation  (The conditions supporting 
this assumption will be explored in Section 2.)   
-  The CEO wage contract is given and exogenous. The interaction between CEO wages 
and  M&A  decisions  would  certainly  be  of  great  interest.  Empirical  evidence  points 
toward a connection between the two (see, e.g., Datta et al., 2001) but this is beyond the 
scope of the present analysis; 
-  The  form  of  ex-post  penalty  in  case  of  disappointing  synergies  is  also  given  and 
exogenous. In practice, it ranges from a one-shot financial penalty, through wage contract 
re-negotiation, up to being fired, depending on the corporate governance mechanisms in 
place  and  the  degree  of  CEO  entrenchment.  For  ease  of  exposition,  we  assume  the 
penalty is dismissal; but any other form of sanction would leave our analysis unchanged. 
 
Outcomes. Three outcomes are possible (see Figure 1): 
-  No Deal: a competitor’s acquisition price is higher or the target successfully rebuffs the 
bid; 
-  Deal and CEO Retention: the bid price is sufficient for the acquisition and realized 
synergies are sufficient for the CEO to avoid being fired; 
-  Deal  and  CEO  Dismissal:  the  acquisition  is  successful  but  the  CEO  is  fired  due  to 
disappointing ex-post synergies.  
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
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To determine his expected utility, the CEO takes into account the probability of the above 
potential  outcomes  as  well  as  the  expected  compensation  in  each  case.  We  denote  S    the 
probability of a successful deal and  F   the probability of being fired. Note that both probabilities 
increase with the acquisition price, which depends on the bid, a function of the CEO’s valuation; 
formally: 
  F S i v p i i , for    )) ( ( (      ,         (4) 
where p(.), β(.) and v are, respectively, the price function, the bidding function and the CEO’s 
valuation of the target.  We mention this functional dependence explicitly only when necessary to 
avoid confusion and postpone to Section 2 the explicit analysis of p(.) and β(.). 
The two opposing forces at play in the CEO’s decision problem give rise to the following 
conditions on the relations between the probabilities ( S   and  F  ) and the target valuation: 








 : the probability of a successful deal increases with target valuation; 








 : the probability of dismissal increases also with target valuation 
(remember that a higher valuation means a higher bid and, therefore, a higher paid price under 
our assumptions). 
CEO wage contract. We use L,  t Ts bMV B ~   and W to denote various components of the 
CEO’s compensation contract; viz.,  
-  W is the present value of the future compensation from existing activities;  
-  t Ts bMV B ~   is the bonus in case of deal completion, composed of a fixed cash bonus B 
and a variable component b, linked to the synergies; 
-  L denotes the loss in the event of dismissal.  
W, B, b and L are known positive constants. 12 
 
This specification of the CEO compensation contract is in line with existing literature and 
with reality (see ao. Hall and Liebman (1998)), Datta et al., 2001, Hall and Murphy, 2002 and 
Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).  
 
1.4 Expected Utility Maximization 
We consider the case of a risk averse CEO (CEOs are known to be under-diversified (Hall 
and Murphy (2002), Becker (2006), Cai and Vijh (2006)). The expected utility of the CEO is 
given by: 
      ) ( ) ~ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( L W U s bMV B W U E W U U E F S t T F S S              ,   (5) 
where U(.) denotes the CEO utility function. The CEO chooses v, the target valuation, in order to 
maximize his expected utility.  We approximate it by a second-order Taylor series expansion 
around W.  This leads to the following first order condition
8: 
    




















L bMV B MV b
L bMV B
F S
s T t s T
F S S
F S s T F S S
 
 
   
     
   (6) 
where γ is the absolute risk aversion coefficient  ) ( ' ) ( ' ' W U W U  .  
 
1.5 Uncertainty Specification 
In  order  to  solve  the  model  (to  obtain  a  closed  form  formula  for  the  expected  utility 
maximizing valuation of the target), we need to specify the probabilities  S   and  F  . Moreover, 
since these probability functions must be invertible, for convenience, we use uniform probability 
distributions.  Although we specify  S   and  F   with respect to valuation, since it is the decision 
                                                        
8 The derivation of Equation (6) is provided in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 13 
 
variable of the CEO, this is equivalent to specifying  S   and  F   with respect to prices. Prices are 
indeed (assumed to be) an increasing function of bids, and bids are (assumed to be) an increasing 
function of valuations (see Equation 4).
9 
The probability of success  S  . Financial markets determine the initial value of the target 
MVT, which essentially fixes the minimum bid price. This minimum price also provides us with a 
natural lower bound for  S  . Define 
 V as  )) ( (
1 1
T MV p V
     , this is to say the minimum 
target valuation such that the acquisition price would be  T MV . At 
 V , the proposed acquisition 
price would be the target’s current market value ( T MV ) and there  would be  no incentive for 
target  shareholders  to  sell  their  shares,  so  any  deal  attempt  would  fail  with  probability  one 
( S  =0). The upper bound of  S   should be determined by a valuation such that the deal attempt 
will succeed with certainty. We denote the corresponding valuation level as 

S V , equal to some 
multiple of  T MV .  S   is uniformly distributed between 
 V  and 

S V . For a given valuation v, the 
probability of success is therefore  ) ( ) (
      V V V v S S  . Note that, as required,  v S    is 
positive: the higher the valuation, the higher the probability of a successful deal.  
The (conditional) probability of being dismissed  F  .  If CEO acquires the target, he risks 
being dismissed with probability  F  . The target market value,  T MV , again provides a natural 
lower  bound.    Indeed,  if v  is  equal  to 
 V   (which  means  that  the  valuation  is  such  that  the 
proposed acquisition price is the current target market value),  there is no reason for the CEO to 
                                                        
9 Since  S   and  F   are cumulative density functions, they are strictly increasing in their arguments. As p(.) 
and β(.) are also increasing in their arguments,  v v p   )) ( ( (    has the same sign as  v v   ) (  . 14 
 
be fired and  F   should be zero.
10  Following the same logic as for  S  , the upper bound of  F   is 
defined as a target valuation level so high that the price paid would lead, with probability one, to 
highly disappointing ex-post realized synergies relative to the acquisition price. The CEO would 
then  be  penalized  (fired)  with  probability  one.  We  denote  this  valuation  level 

F V .    The 
probability of being fired is therefore uniformly distributed between 
 V  and 

F V  and equal to 
) ( ) (
      V V V v F F  .  We  note  that,  as  expected,  v F     is  positive:  the  higher  the 
valuation, the higher the probability of being fired. 
Classical  equilibrium arguments show that 

F V  must be  equal to 

S V .
11 We can therefore 
explicitly relate 

F V  and 

S V  to some multiple of the target market value  T MV . We denote it θ: 
)) ( (
1 1
T S F MV p V V V  
        . 
 
The unconditional probabilities. The probabilities of missing out on the deal, doing the deal 
and not being fired and doing the deal and being fired are respectively  ) 1 ( S   ,  ) 1 ( F S     and  
F S   (see Figure 2).   








S  1 , the probability of missing out on the deal decreases linearly as v 
increases (see Figure 2, Panel A);  

























F S ) 1 (   ,  the  probability  doing  the  deal  and  not  being 
fired is a concave function (see Figure 2, Panel B). When v is close to 
 V  (no premium 
                                                        
10 It could be argued that if the CEO has wasted a lot of his time and the time of others on valuing the deal, 
only to come up with the market value, maybe he should be fired for being wasteful. We abstract here from 
this complication for ease of exposition. 
11 The argument is provided in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 15 
 
over the prevailing market price), increasing v has a strong impact on the probability of 
doing the deal and not being fired. When v is high, the probability of doing the deal (the 
sum  of  ) ( F S    and  ) 1 ( F S    )  still  increases  but  the  probability  of  being  fired 
eventually dominates; 














F S  , the probability of being fired (given that the deal attempt has 
succeeded) is convex (see Figure 2, Panel C). For high v the increase in the probability of 
being fired becomes significant. This captures the intuition that the corporate governance 
system (either internal or external) comes into play as a last resort mechanism. The CEO 
risks dismissal when the deal brings wealth destruction for bidder shareholders; but even 
below  that  extreme,  dismissal  is  possible  simply  because  the  acquisition  price  is 
excessive relative to the realized synergies ex post. This property of our specification is 
consistent with the empirical results provided by Mitchell and Lehn (1990) and Lehn and 
Zhao (2006). 
 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
 
1.6 Target valuation 
Using the definition of  S   and  F  , we can now solve the model. This results in our first 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1. CEO’s valuation of the target 
Under the assumptions of Sections 1.1 to 1.5, which can be summarized as CEO risk aversion, 
uniformly distributed probability of being penalized in case of disappointing ex-post realized 
synergies relative to the acquisition price and exogenous competition, a linear wage contract, 16 
 
Bayesian learning based on previous deal experience and efficient financial markets, the CEO’s 
reservation valuation is: 
) 2 ( ) ˆ 2 ) ) ( 2 ((








2 2 2 *
L L MV b bMV B bMV B
MV b bMV B bMV B
V V
V v
t s T s T s T
t s T s T s T
     
    
     







The derivation of Proposition 1 is given in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 
 
Proposition 1 is a key to understanding the effect of learning on the CEO’s decision process: it 
connects  the  CEO’s  valuation  of  the  target  (the  maximum  price  he  is  willing  to  pay  or  his 
certainty-equivalent) to his risk aversion ( ), expected synergies ( s  ) and his perception of the 
risk associated with synergies (
2
, ˆ t s  ). Equations (2) and (3) display the Bayesian updating process 
used by the CEO to incorporate signals sent by the market.  So, the combination of Proposition 1 
and Equations (2) and (3) represent tools for exploring the learning mechanism.  To use them 
fully, we must now establish the links between the CEO valuation, his bidding function and his 
offering  price  function  (up  to  now,  we  have  simply  assumed  that  these  functions  are  strictly 
increasing  in  his  valuation).  To  interpret  Proposition  1,  we  note  that 




t s T s T s T MV b bMV B bMV B            is  the  risk  adjusted  bonus  and 
) 2 (








                                                        
12 The arguments are provided in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 17 
 
1.7 Determinants of the CEO’s valuation 
The CEO’s valuation of the target and the perceived synergies are connected through  the 
CEO’s wage contract. The study of the relation between the CEO’s valuation and the expected 
bonus and its variance allows us to derive the following results
13: 







s T bMV B
v

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t s T MV b
v

.              (9) 
Equation  (8)  shows  that,  for  ) ( s T bMV B     between  0  and   1 ,  ) ( * s T bMV B v       is 
positive. An increase in the expected bonus leads to an increase in the CEO’s reservation value. 




s T t s T bMV B MV b      ,  Equation  (8’) 
shows that the derivative is negative. This second situation might seem strange as an increase in 
the expected bonus could lead to a decrease in the CEO’s reservation value. Such a possibility is a 
consequence of the convexity of  F S  , depicted in Figure 2 – Panel C. A high expected bonus 
combined  with  a  low  bonus  variance  dramatically  increases  the  CEO’s  loss  in  the  event  of 
dismissal. Rather than vigorously pursuing the deal, the CEO responds by reducing the risk of 
                                                        
13 The derivation is provided in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 18 
 
being fired. In short, he has more to lose than to win (a similar argument is used by Barro (2006) 
to explain the equity premium puzzle).  Such behavior is consistent with (internal or external) 
corporate  control  mechanisms  that  become  more  vigorous  after  value  destruction  (the 
unconditional probability  of  dismissal is  convex  with respect to the premium).  Equation (9) 
shows that an increase in the (perceived) variance of the expected bonus leads to a decrease in the 
CEO’s reservation value. 
2. Bidding and Buying the Target 
The previous section derived the CEO’s valuation for the target. Valuations are however not 
observable  as  such.  They  are  one  of  the  main  drivers  of  decisions  but  only  the  decisions 
themselves are observable. Within the M&A context, the CEO’s decision is the bid chosen in the 
attempt to acquire the target.  Hence, we have to associate bids with valuations.  This is however 
only an intermediate step.  The ex post observable acquisition price will only emerge after bids 
have been confronted  with rival bids and target shareholders reactions. The acquisition price 
essentially  determines  whatever  wealth  is  created  or  destroyed  for  the  bidding  firm’s 
shareholders.  This section is dedicated to filling in the details between valuations, bids and ex-
post observable prices.  
When  talking  about  the  M&A  market,  most  often,  large  and  highly  publicized  takeover 
contests come into mind. It is by reference to these cases that target acquisitions have most often 
been modeled as ascending auctions (see Bullow et al. (1999) or Betton et al. (2005)), in which a 
set of bidders compete to acquire a target, putting increasing bids on the table until all but one 
bidders quit. Under  some restrictive assumptions (independent private valuations, quasi-linear 
payoffs, risk-neutral bidders), the Myerson’s lemma holds (see Theorem 3.3 in Milgrom (2004)) 
and the ascending auction is revenue and pay-off equivalent to the second best price auction, 
which simplifies greatly the analysis.  But public tender offers represent only one form taken by 
M&A operations and, even if they are frequently very large deals, they represent a minority of 19 
 
cases.  Schwert (2000) reports 763 tender offers out of 2,346 deals (33%) during the period 1975-
1996. Hostile bids are even less frequent. Andrade et al (2001), studying the period 1973-1998, 
report a percentage of hostile bids varying from 4% (1990-1998) to 14.3% (1980-1989).  
How then are firms sold in the remaining cases? Boone and Mulherin (2007) report new and 
interesting results. The authors study a sample of 400 acquisitions from the nineties. Using data 
from SEC merger documents, they show that half of the targets were auctioned among multiple 
bidders and that the remaining half were sold through a direct negotiation between the parties.  
Hansen  (2001)  studies  in  detail  the  process  with  which  firms  are  auctioned  by  financial 
intermediaries; a  key  difference from tender  offers  is frequent use  of a sealed-bid  first price 
auction.  In contrast, for direct negotiation acquisitions, there is no direct competition. To sum-up, 
there  are  at  least  three  distinct  forms  of  M&A  deals:  public  tender  offers,  private  auctions 
organized by financial intermediaries and direct negotiation between the parties.  This section is 
devoted to the bidding and pricing implications of each type. The three most important issues are: 
-  CEO risk-aversion;  
-  Acquirers’ asymmetry: Section 1 models how learning affects private valuations of the 
target. But learning comes from experience accumulated with previous deals and previous 
deals are publicly known. Therefore, when potential acquirers compete to buy a target, 
they  know  something  about  the  historical  records  of  each  other.  This  implies  an 
asymmetry in target valuations.  In ascending auctions or first price sealed-bid auctions, 
this asymmetry is presumably taken into account by rational bidders. Asymmetry among 
potential acquirers’ is explicitly modeled in Povel and Singh (2006), where the authors 
establish  how  targets  should  optimally  sell  themselves  in  such  a  framework. 
Complementing the results of Maskin and Riley (2000), Aroamena and Cantillon (2004) 
provides  key  insight  about  expected  revues  in  first  and  second  prices  asymmetric 
auctions.  20 
 
-  positive correlation of acquirers’ valuations: a major empirical phenomenon about M&As 
is their appearance in waves (see, e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).  It has been argued 
that  it  could  be  due  to  systematic  mis-valuations  in  financial  markets  (Shleifer  and 
Vishny, 2003) or to common market or industry wide shocks (Harford, 2005). Common 
shocks  are  a  clear  source  of  positive  correlation  between  synergies  potentially 
implemented by acquirers.  
Having identified the key features to take into account, we are led to Proposition 2 below.  
Note  that  the  analysis  is  based  on  the  Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium  concept  and  the  Harsanyi 
coherence doctrine. 
PROPOSITION 2. Bidding and price functions 
Auctions. Under the assumptions of risk averse CEOs (with monotonic and log supermodular 
utility  functions),  asymmetric  valuation  distributions,  positively  correlated  valuations  and 
competition limited to two acquirers, the equilibrium bidding and price functions in tender offers 
and private auctions are strictly increasing in the valuation of the winning CEO. In both cases, at 
equilibrium,  ex-post  observable  prices  are  increasing  in  valuation.  In  the  case  of  private 
auctions,  the  results  hold  under  the  assumption  of  conditional  stochastic  dominance  of  the 
valuation distribution of the learning bidder over the other bidders. 
Bargaining. Under the assumptions of a risk averse acquirer CEO (with a monotonic and log 
supermodular utility function) and a target with random positively correlated reserve price, the 
equilibrium bidding and price functions are strictly increasing in the CEO’s reservation value. 
The proofs are given in the One-Line Appendix to this paper. 
3. Ex-post Observable Implications 
This third section is devoted to the observable consequences of Propositions 1 and 2. The 
first issue concerns the effect of learning on expected profits of the acquirer. Expected profits are  
the product of two terms: 21 
 
(i) the wealth effect of the deal conditional on doing the deal (the value of the good in the 
case of winning the auction);  
(ii) the probability of buying the target (the probability of winning the auction). 
As emphasized in Section 1, learning is the source of asymmetry between bidders. Analyzing 
the effect of learning on expect profits amounts therefore to analyzing the effects of asymmetry 
on the equilibrium expected profits of bidders. Cantillon (forthcoming) has shown, extending the 
analysis  of  Maskin  and  Riley  (2000),  that  asymmetry  between  bidders  increases  the  strong 
bidder’s expected profits (decreases the seller expected revenues). The intuition behind this result 
is  the  fact  that  asymmetry  reduces  the  pressure  of  competition  among  bidders,  allowing  the 
winner to keep a higher fraction of its valuation. Applied to our problem, this result, means that 
learning increases the CEOs expected profits in equilibrium. 
But expected profits are not observable.  We only observe indirectly its two components: 
-  wealth effect conditional on doing deals: since deals are publicly announced for listed 
acquirers, market reactions are typically available.  Assuming that the probability of deal 
completion is high once the deal has been announced (which is the case for most deals, 
particularly small ones), this is the investors’ estimate of the wealth effect associated with 
the deal.  Note however that the availability of bids and premiums over the target’s value 
is far more limited.  Among difficulties are the complexity of payments (e.g., a package 
containing stock, cash and other contingent claims) and the paucity of information about 
private targets.  Perhaps these empirical constraints explain why most recent large sample 
studies focus on acquirers’ CARs.
14 
-  the probability of buying the target: contrary to CAR, this second component of the CEO 
expected profits is not observable.  Unsuccessful deal attempts are (mostly) empirically 
                                                        
14 One exception is Officer (forthcoming), where the author produces evidence on acquisition discounts 
obtained for unlisted targets using the comparable industry transaction method. 22 
 
unobservable.  We observe only completed deals by a given CEO and, therefore, the time 
between successive completed deals (TBD).  
The absence of a proxy for expected profits explains why the results derived in Section 2 are so 
crucial  for  establishing  empirically  testable  predictions.    Indeed,  Proposition  2  provides  the 
necessary foundation for investigating the effects of learning on CAR and TBD.  
We begin this third section by establishing the relation between bids, prices and market 
reactions to deal announcements (CARs).  We then derive empirical predictions about CARs and 
the  time  between  successive  deals  (TBD.)    Finally,  we  look  at  how  hubris  affects  these 
predictions.  
 
3.1 Investor Information and CAR 
Remember that CAR represents the ex-post observable investors’ estimate of the deal value 
for  the  shareholders  conditionally  on  doing  the  deal.  This  conditional  estimate  is  itself  an 
expectation: the expected value of the target acquisition for the acquirer. As is has been shown 
that strong-form market efficiency is an unsustainable assumption (see Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980)),  we  rely  on  the  more  compelling  semi-strong  version  of  market  efficiency,  wherein 
investors  process  all  pertinent  public  information.  In  such  as  framework,  the  acquirer  CAR 
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where  A MV  is the acquirer market value and 1/R is the discount factor. Abnormal returns are the 
difference between the risk adjusted expected synergy and the premium paid to acquire the target, 
divided by the acquirer’s market value. Under our semi-strong efficiency assumption, investors’ 
synergy  anticipation  is  s  .  This  explains  why,  in  Section  1,  market  reactions  to  deal 23 
 
announcements were modeled as signals  t  ~  drawn from  ) , (
2
  s N ; i.e., market reactions are 
unbiased.    From  Proposition  2,  bids  and  ex-post  prices  are  strictly  increasing  in  the  CEO’s 
valuation  * v ;  consequently,    Equation  (10)  highlights  the  negative  relation  between  ex -post 
observed abnormal returns and the CEO’s valuation: 
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Equation (11) connects the CEO’s valuation to investors’ reactions.  We are now in position to 
better  understand  the  observable  implications  of  learning  and  hubris.  Note  that  this  negative 
relation between ex-post observable CAR and CEO valuation does not conflict with the positive 
relation  between  learning  and  ex-ante  equilibrium  expected  profits  of  the  acquirer.  It  is  the 
consequence of two phenomena: 
-  we only capture here one of the two components of expected profits (the wealth effect); 
-  Equation  (10)  confirms  that  the  CEO’s  perception  of  the  risk  does  not  matter  to  the 
shareholders,  who  apply  their  discount  factor  1/R  to  the  expected  synergies.  The 
shareholders’ discount factor is driven by their diversification opportunities. 
 
3.2. Empirical Implications of Learning 
As explained in Section 1.2, learning is the process by which the CEO incorporates signals 
sent by the market at each deal announcement. The Bayesian updating rule progressively forms 
more precise beliefs about the potential synergies (Equation (3)). Learning has implications for 
both the pattern of CARs from deal to deal and the probability that the CEO succeeds in making a 
deal. 
The CAR from deal to deal. Using equations (11) and (9), it is now possible to explore the 
implications  of  learning  on  the  observed  CAR  around  deal  announcements.  The  logical 24 
 
consequences of rational CEO’s learning are presented in Figure 3 – Panel A - left chart: the more 
the CEO learns (receives signals from the market), the more accurate his forecasting ability, and 
the  lower 
2
, ˆ t s    (see  Equation  (3)).  A  decrease  in 
2
, ˆ t s    leads  to  an  increase  in  the  CEO’s 
reservation value (see Equation (9)), which translates (by Proposition 2) into more aggressive 
bidding behavior and higher acquisition prices. Consequently, the acquirer’s CAR (see Equation 
(11)) declines from deal to deal. This conclusion seems counterintuitive but it is, as explained in 
introduction  of    this  section,  simply  a  consequence  of  the  reduction  in  risk  perception  that 
learning allows. According to our model, the declining CAR trend reported in introduction is 
compatible with learning (with the exception of Billet and Qian (2005), who report systematically 
negative CAR). Therefore, a declining CAR trend from deal to deal does NOT necessarily imply 
the existence of hubris. Our conclusion is obtained with a constant investment opportunity set 
(constant  s   from deal to deal) and thus is not caused by decreasing investment opportunities. 
Our conclusion is also obtained without any sort of acquirer budget constraint and is therefore not 
driven by target picking behavior.  It is neither a consequence of hubris (or any other form of 
cognitive bias), since the CEO know the true expected synergy s   and is a Bayesian updater. 
Instead, it is a direct consequence of learning. 
 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
 
The probability of doing deals and the TBD. More aggressive bidding affects the probability 
of a deal.  This can be seen for tender offers
15, as analyzed in Section 2.  Recall that the derivation 
is limited to two rival potential acquirers competing for a given target.  Denote by  ) (.
*
* i v v F
j  the 
cumulative probability distribution of CEO  j’s (the opponent) valuation conditional on CEO i’s 
                                                        
15 A similar argument is valid for the cases of private auction and direct negotiation. 25 
 
reservation value (the reservation value are positively correlated). Then, the probability that CEO 
i wins the competition is simply: 
) ( ) valuation CEO valuation CEO Pr(
* *
* i i v j i v v F
j   .     (12) 




























 .        (13) 
On  the  right  side  of  the  equality  in  Equation  (13),  the  first  term  is  a  density  function  and  is 
therefore  non-negative  and  the  second  term  is  negative  by  Equation  (9).    Since  learning,  by 
Equation (3) reduces 
2
, ˆ t i  , learning leads to an increase in the probability of acquiring the target.  
This is intuitive: the higher the valuation, the more aggressive the bidding behavior, the higher the 
probability of outbidding competitors, ceteris paribus.  Since the investment opportunity set is 
constant (the number of acquisition opportunities per time period is constant), learning brings a 
reduction in the average elapsed TBD (see Figure 3 – Panel A – right chart). 
Note  that  the  results  of  Cantillon  (forthcoming)  show  that  the  positive  effect  of  learning 
(asymmetry) on the probability of acquiring the target (the probability of winning the auction) 
dominates the negative effects of learning on CAR (the wealth effect conditional on doing the 
deal) in equilibrium. 
 
3.3 On the Implications of Hubris  
How does hubris affect the empirical implications of learning?  To explore such an issue, we 
must first define precisely what hubris means.  Following Malmendier and Tate (2006), hubris is 
a cognitive bias in the CEO’s decision making process.  Hubris can affect either the CEO’s initial 
perception  (the  anticipated  synergy  at  the  first  deal  attempt),  or  his  learning  process  (the 26 
 
interpretation of market reactions to past deals), or both.  For simplicity, we now assume that 
hubris  affects  the  CEO’s  initial  perception.
16  If  he  is  not  fired  after  completing  his  first 
acquisition, we assume he will learn something, despite the initial hubris.  From deal to deal, this 
learning process should bring a progressive correction of the initial bias.  Perhaps this assumption 
does  not  describe  the  behavior  of  every  CEOs  seemingly  infected  by  hubris.  Well-known 
instances reported in the financial press do allow for much optimism… but it seems reasonable to 
presume that CEOs unable to overcome hubris will be fired at a higher rate than others who 
correct erroneous initial assessments.  Learning CEOs should therefore have a higher survival 
rate.
 17 
A  CEO’s  initial  perception  may  be  biased  in  two  dimensions:  with  respect  to  expected 
synergies or with respect to the perceived volatility of synergies. Hubris can be characterized as 




, 0 ˆ t t    ).   Since  either  cognitive  biases 
leads  to  the  same  empirical  predications,  we  analyze  only  the  first  case  and  define  a  hubris -
infected CEOs as having the prior  ) ˆ , ˆ (
2
0 , , 0 s s N   , with  s s    , 0 ˆ . The immediate consequence is 
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16 Analyzing the empirical consequences of growing hubris from deal to deal could be a promising future 
research avenue, perhaps pertinent to large and active serial acquirers headed by notoriously overconfident 
CEOs. 
17This raises a question of why, in the long run, any CEOs at all remain hubris infected.  Perhaps an 
endogenous treatment of corporate governance mechanisms would provide the key to an answer, an 
interesting issue for future research. 27 
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The  CEO’s  perception  of  expected  synergies  converges  towards  the  true  population  value: 
learning progressively corrects the initial distorted perception.  
Before exploring the empirical predictions of hubris, we should mention that the cognitive 
bias does not by itself violate the Harsanyi coherence doctrine. So long as the CEO’s beliefs 
remain internally consistent, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution concept used in Section 2 
remains well defined.  
As hubris infected CEOs (or equivalently over-optimistic CEOs in our setup) over-value the 
target; using the implications of Proposition 2, they overbid. Following the same reasoning as in 
Section 3.2, they over-pay for the target.  One should therefore observe either an initial negative 
CAR or a surprisingly low initial CAR (with respect to the true potential synergies).
18  With 
subsequent  learning,  the  same  CEOs  should  progressively  correct  their  initial  perceptions, 
improve their valuation abilities, bid more cautiously, and reduce any value destruction.  Bu t, as 
they bid less aggressively, they should win less frequently in competition with other acquirers. 
These predictions are summarized in Figure 4 – Panel B and C.
19 In the case of a negative initial 
CAR (Panel B), the source of learning is the negative in vestor  reaction  at  the  first  deal’s 
                                                        
18Overbidding will not necessarily result in a negative CAR if synergies are high enough.  The hubris -
infected CEO bid could concede too high a fraction of the wealth created to target shareholders but still 
retain some wealth for acquiring shareholders. 
19As explained in Section 1.7 (see equations (8) and (8’)), we must remain careful at this point of the 
analysis. For already highly remunerated CEOs, risk-aversion could lead to the opposite behavior. 28 
 
announcement.  In the case of a low initial CAR (relative to the true synergies), the source of the 
learning  could  be  the  action  of  a  well-informed  shareholder  (who  is  aware  of  the  CEO’s 
overbidding behavior) or the CEO’s reaction to a disappointingly low CAR.  
These  implications  contrast  sharply  with  the  literature’s  previous  contention  that  hubris-
infected CEO’s should experience a declining CAR from deal to deal.  If hubris-infected CEOs 
also learn (an assumption difficult to dismiss out of hand, particularly given internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms), the observed CAR trend should actually be growing (in the 
case of Panel C, at least relative to the CAR that would have been observed with rational CEOs.) 
The decreasing rhythm (i.e., growing TBD) for hubris-infected CEOs is indirectly pointed out in 
Conn et al. (2004). 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 imply our third and final proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3. Empirical implications of learning and hubris   
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, assuming semi-strong form market 
efficiency, the CAR and TBD trends of acquisition programs undertaken by rational CEOs should 
be decreasing (see Figure 3 – Panel A). For hubris infected CEOs, (whose cognitive biases are 
assumed to affect their prior perceptions of expected synergies), the CAR and TBD trends of 
acquisition programs should be increasing (see Figure 3 – Panels B and C). 
   
Note finally that the predictions of Proposition 3 on both the CAR and the TBD, for rational 
and  hubris  infected  CEOs,  are  specific  to  our  learning  framework.  In  particular,  decreasing 
investment opportunities could explain a declining CAR, but it would be common to both types 
of CEOs.  
4. Conclusion
20 
                                                        
20 We provide additional material about empirical issues in the On-Line Appendix to this paper. 29 
 
The  declining  trend  of  CARs  in  acquisition  programs  is  an  empirical  fact.    The  theory 
presented  here  suggests  that  the  pattern  is  not  necessarily  due  to  CEOs  infected  by  hubris.  
Economically motivated risk averse rational CEOs who learn from investor reactions to past deal 
announcements, should adopt a behavior that leads to the observed empirical pattern.  However, 
the declining CAR trend could be due to other causes, such as a declining investment opportunity 
set, budget constraints or increasing competition during merger waves.   
But our learning hypothesis delivers specific and unique predictions that can serve as the 
bases  for  distinguishing  empirical  tests.  These  predictions  are  about  both  the  announcement 
period cumulative abnormal return of acquiring firms (the CAR) and about the  time between 
successive acquisitions, (TBD), for both rational and hubris infected CEOs.  In short, rational 
CEOs,  learning  form  deal  to  deal,  should  bid  more  aggressively  over  time.  The  fraction  of 
synergies they concede to target shareholders should increase over time, leading to a declining 
CAR, and  more frequent success  in beating competitors, hence reducing also the TBD). The 
reverse should hold for hubris-infected CEOs. The mechanism at play is reminiscencent of the 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) analysis of information disclosure with risk averse bidders. 
 Note also that, as the CEO is more risk averse than his shareholders, his bidding behavior is 
suboptimal from the point of view of the shareholders. This can be interpreted as a sort of agency 
cost. We show in Section 1 that learning reduces the CEO’s perception of risks associated with 
the target acquisition. So, learning reduces the gap between the bidding behavior adopted by the 
CEO and the one desired by shareholders.  
Our  conclusions  are  obtained  within  a  private  valuation  framework  where  synergies  are 
assessed without considering potential competing bidders.  Extending the analysis to a common 
value framework might bring additional insights.  In common-value auctions, bidders’ valuations 




depend on the valuations of competitors, which are revealed by their bidding behavior.  Modeling 
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Figure  1.  The  CEO’s  decision  problem.  φS  denotes the probability of a successful deal and  φF  the 
probability of being dismissed after disappointing ex-post realized synergies with respect to the acquisition 
price, conditionally on having done the deal. W,  t Ts bMV B ~  , and L denote, respectively, the present value 
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Figure 2. Unconditional probabilities as functions of target valuation v. Panel A plots the probability of missing out on the deal, which decreases linearly as 
v increases.  Panel B shows the probability doing the deal and not being fired.  Panel C plots the probability of being fired, given that the CEO has completed 









































Figure 3. Bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and time between successive deals (TBD). 
The X-axis represents the deal sequence order number in an acquisition program undertaken by the 
same  CEO.  The  Y-axis  is  either  the  ex-post  observable  CAR  or  the  TBD.  Panel  A  –  left  chart, 
considering rational CEOs, shows the declining pattern of ex-post observable CARs from deal to deal, 
as a consequence of the learning process. The associated right chart highlights the shortening TBD. 
Panel  B,  focusing  on  hubris  infected  CEOs,  illustrates  the  opposite  pattern.  Panel  C  summarizes 
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Supplement B - Notations and Conventions 
 
~  Indicates a random variable 
^  Indicates a perceived value of a population parameter 
s    Population (or real) value of expected synergies 
t s, ˆ    Expected synergies at deal t as perceived by the CEO 
T MV   Target market value 
t s ~   Synergies created by the merger 
2
s    Population (or real) value of the variance of synergies 
2
, ˆ t s    Variance of the synergies at deal t as perceived by the CEO 
t  ~   Signal sent by the market at deal t announcement about potential synergies 
2
    Variance of the signals sent by the market (market informativeness) 
S    Probability of successful deal 
F    Probability of CEO being firing due to disappointing synergies ex post 
v  CEO valuation of the target 
p(.)  Price function 
β(.)  Bidding function 
W  Present value of the CEO’s current wage contract 
L  Penalty incurred by the CEO from being dismissed 
t s b B ~    CEO bonus associated with a successful deal (B is the fixed part and b is the 
variable part) 
U(.)  CEO Utility function 
γ  CEO risk aversion 
 V
  Minimum valuation of the target to have any chance of a successful deal 
)) ( (
1 1
T S MV p V  
      Target valuation, defined as some multiple θ of the current market value, such 




T F MV p V  
      Target valuation, defined as some multiple θ of the current market value, such 
that the induced price would be so high that ex-post synergies would be highly 
disappointing and would lead, with probability one, to the CEO being fired. 
) (.
*
* i v v F




* i v v f
j   Corresponding density function. 
) , (
*
i i v b    CEO i expected surplus when he has valuation 
*





Supplement C- Market Value of the Target in Case of Acquisition: An Alternative Specification 
 
As in Section 1, the synergy potentially created by the merger is not perfectly known to the 
acquirer. We denote it  t s ~ . We however specify this time the target market value ( T MV ) in case of 
deal completion as: 
t s
T T e MV MV
~
n acquisitio   ,         (C1) 
instead of Equation (1). This modification sets the lower bound on the target market value to zero 
in case of acquisition. We still assume that  t s ~  follows a Gaussian distribution  ) , (
2
s s N   .  
In this modified setup, the CEO’s bonus follows a log-normal distribution with first and second 
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(instead of  s b B    in the Section 1 setup). 
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s T t s T bMV B MV b      in the Section 1 setup). 
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       
. (C4) 
So, using the Equation (C1) specification and properties of the log -normal distribution, we 
can still derive the CEO’s reservation value. Equation (C4) can be used to explore, as in Section  
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1.7, the  determinants of the CEO’s valuation. For example, it can be shown that a sufficient 
condition for the CEO’s valuation to decline with perceived synergies is that the risk aversion 
coefficient   be bigger than 2. 
To sum-up, it is technically possible to adopt a specification such that the lower bound of the 
target market value in case of acquisition is zero.  But this complicates the exposition without 
providing more insights.   
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Supplement D – Equation 6 derivation 
 
The expected utility of the CEO is given by: 
      ) ( ) ~ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( L W U s bMV B W U E W U U E F S t T F S S              ,   (D1) 
where U(.) denotes the CEO utility function. We approximate it by a second-order Taylor series 
expansion around W.  This leads to the following expressions: 
) ( ' '
2
1
) ( ' ) ( ) (
2 W U L W LU W U L W U     .      (D2) 
    ) ( ' ' ~
2
1
) ( ' ~ ) ( ) ~ (
2 W U s bMV B W U s bMV B W U s bMV B W U t T t T t T        .  (D3) 
Substituting Equations (6) and (7) into Equation (5) yields: 
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 .  (D4) 
The CEO chooses v, the target valuation, in order to maximize his expected utility.  This leads to 
the following first order condition: 
    
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F S
s T t s T
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 
 
   
     
,   (D5) 
where γ is the absolute risk aversion coefficient  ) ( ' ) ( ' ' W U W U  .   
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Supplement E – Common upper bound of probabilities of success and of being dismissed 
 
Ex-ante,  S   and  F   must have common range. As explained in Section 1.5, they have the 
same lower bound 
 V .  Suppose that 
   S F V V , for any valuation between 

F V  and 

S V , the deal 
would succeed with probability one and the probability of being fired would continue to increase.  
Hence, there would be no reason for the CEO to value the target above 

S V . The same kind of 
argument  applies  for  the  case 
   S F V V .  So,  we  assume,  without  loss  of  generality,  that 
   S F V V :  S   and  F    have common range. We can now explicitly relate 

F V  and 

S V  to some 
multiple of the target market value  T MV . We denote it θ:  )) ( (
1 1
T S F MV p V V V  
        .  
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Supplement F - Proposition 1 derivation 
 
To obtain Equation (7), we start from Equation (6): 
 
    
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   
     
,   (F1) 
Using the  definition  of  S   and  F   (see Section 1.6),  we  compute the  derivative  of  S   and 
) ( F S   with respect to v, the CEO valuation of the target: 
)) ( ( )) ( (
1 1
1 1 1 1
T T
S
MV p MV p V V v
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.   (F3) 
Using equations (F2) and (F3), we solve the CEO’s first order condition (Equation (F1)). This 
results in Proposition 1.  
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Supplement G – Positive risk adjusted bonus  
 
To see that the risk adjusted bonus must be positive at v*, note that the probabilities  S   and  F  , 
estimated at 
* v , must (by definition) be positive.  Also note that when L is zero (implying no loss 
in case of dismissal), Equation (7) implies 
* v  equals to  2 ) (
  V V . This is intuitive since the 
reservation value should maximize the probability of a successful takeover and not being fired 
(see Figure 2 – Panel B).  However, if L is positive (which we assume), the optimal valuation is 
below  2 ) (
  V V  (see Figure 2, Panel B) as the derivative of v* with respect to L is negative. 
In  this  region,  the  derivative  of  ) 1 ( F S      with  respect  to 
* v   is  positive.  Computing  this 
derivative  and  taking  into  account  its  positive  sign  leads  to  a  positive  risk  adjusted  bonus 








Supplement H - Determinants of the CEO valuation  
 
Expected  bonus.  We  are  interested  in  the  sign  of  ) ( * s T bMV B v     .  A  mechanical 
application of calculus rules to Equation (7) shows that, as  ) ( s T bMV B  
 must be positive (see 
Section 1.6), the sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of  )) ( 1 ( s T bMV B     , which 
is  positive  if    1 ) (   s T bMV B .  We  also  know  from  Section  1.6  that 
2 ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( s T s T bMV B bMV B         must  be  greater  than 
2
,
2 2 ˆ ) 2 ( t s T MV b   .  This  second 




s T t s T bMV B MV b      .  
These two conditions lead to the situation presented in Figure H.1: 
-  for  ) ( s T bMV B    between 0 and   1 :  ) ( * s T bMV B v      is positive. An increase 
in the expected bonus leads to an increase in the CEO’s reservation value.  




s T t s T bMV B MV b      ,  the 
derivative is negative.  
 
Expected  bonus  variance.  The  sign  of 
2
,
2 2 ˆ * t s T MV b v      depends  on  the  sign  of  the 
derivatives  of 
2
,
2 2 2 ˆ ) 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( t s T s T s T MV b bMV b bMV b            with  respect  to 
2
,
2 2 ˆ t s T MV b  .  The  risk  aversion  coefficient     being  positive  by  definition,  the  sign  of 
2
,
2 2 ˆ * t s T MV b v     is negative. An increase in the (perceived) variance of the expected bonus 





Figure H.1. The CEO’s reservation value as a function of the expected bonus. The curve depicted plots 
the CEO’s reservation value with respect to  ) ( s T bMV B   , which is the expected bonus in case of deal 
completion.  The  dashed  area  denotes  the  zone  of  inadmissible  parameter  values.  If 
) ) ( ˆ ( ) 2 ( ) (
2
, s T t s s T bMV B bMV B          than some unconditional probability outcomes are negative. 
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Supplement I – Proposition 2 derivation 
 
We first provide intuitive arguments. We then turn to more formal arguments. 
 
Intuition 
In Section I, we showed that learning increases the CEO’s valuation (the maximum price he 
is willing to pay to acquire the target). The learning mechanism is characterized by two important 
features: 
-  as learning comes from past acquisitions, it is common knowledge to the bidders: bidders 
know (or at least have a good idea about) their respective levels of experience; 
-  learning  generates  asymmetry:  as  learning  increases  valuation  (a  right-shift  of  the 
valuation distribution) and as learning is common knowledge, the more a bidder learns 
through  past  acquisitions,  everything  else  equal,  the  more  the  valuation  distributions 
between bidders become asymmetric. 
So, taking into account asymmetry is a key to understanding the impact of learning on the CEOs 
bidding behavior and price formation mechanism in the market for corporate control. 
The bidding and price determination mechanisms of tender offers and private auctions are 
respectively the open ascending auction and the sealed-bid first-price auction. In the case of an 
ascending  auction,  the  auctioneer  starts  the  process  at  some  low  price  and  increases  it 
progressively.  Bidders quit the auction as the price rises until only one bidder remains.  The last 
bidder wins the auction and pays the price that prompted the second-to-last bidder to exit. In an 
ascending auction, the dominant strategy is therefore to bid one’s own valuation: by quitting at an 
inferior price level, the bidder looses the  opportunity to  make a profitable acquisition but by 
bidding  more, he risks paying  more than the target  is really worth to him. It is important to 
emphasize that this is a dominant strategy: it does not depend on the strategy adopted by other 
bidders. This result holds even in the case of risk aversion, asymmetry and correlation. So, in an 
ascending  auction,  the  bidding  function  is  increasing  in  the  valuation.  The  acquisition  price,  
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conditionally on winning the auction, is the valuation of the second-best bidder.  If the bidders’ 
valuations are independent, there is no mechanism that connects the winning bidder’s valuation 
and the price he pays.  If, however, bidders’ valuations are positively correlated, then an increase 
in the winning bidder’s valuation will be statistically associated with an increase in other bidders’ 
valuations, among which the second-best bidder.  In such a case, the price function is increasing 
in  the  winning  bidder  valuation.  Note  however  that  if  we  focus  on  the  expected  ex-post 
observable price, even in the case of independent values, an increase in valuation leads the bidder 
to win more often and, by this channel, increases the expected ex-post observable price. 
Let us now turn to the case of a sealed-bid first price auction. The winning bidder is the one 
who proposes the highest price and he will pay his bid. The determination of the equilibrium 
bidding function is based, in this case, on the maximization of the bidder’s expected payoff.  As 
shown below, in the case of risk aversion, asymmetry and positively correlated valuation, we 
obtain (using the framework of Maskin and Riley (2000b)) a set of differential equations that 
characterizes equilibrium behaviors of bidders. Technical arguments (using the single crossing 
difference condition and the monotonic selection theorem – see Milgrom (2004)) show that the 
induced equilibrium bidding function is increasing in the bidders’ valuation. As the price paid by 
the winning bidder is his own bid, the price function (by definition) is also increasing in the 
(winning) bidder’s valuation. In the first price auction however, as emphasized by Arozamena 
and Cantillon (2004), showing that the bidding function is increasing in valuation is not enough to 
infer  the  consequences  of  change  in  asymmetry  on  ex-post  observable  prices.  This  is 
fundamentally due to the fact that optimal bidding strategies of bidders are inter-dependent (they 
are not dominant strategies). The equilibrium response of rival bidders to a change in asymmetry 
must therefore be taken into account. Using the results provided by Arozamena and Cantillon 
(2004), we show below that, for an increase in asymmetry (defined as a right-shift of the bidder 
valuation distribution), the ex-post observable price conditional on winning the auction contest is 




In direct negotiations, the bidding behavior of the acquirer is influenced by some form of 
information asymmetry (see Hansen (1987) for an application involving the choice of payment 
medium). We capture this asymmetry by assuming that the seller’s reserve price is unknown to 
the acquirer. Assuming moreover that the dominant strategy of the acquirer is a first and final 
offer (see Samuelson (1984) for an analysis of the context in which such a result holds), the 
equilibrium bidding function of the acquirer can easily be derived. The same technical arguments 
as used for first-price sealed-bid auctions imply that the bidding function is increasing  in the 
bidder valuation. Since the bidder pays his own bid if accepted by the seller, the price function is 
(again by definition) increasing in the bidder’s valuation. The issue of equilibrium rival bidders’ 
adjustment does not arise here, as there are no such rival bidders and the seller’s role is essentially 
passive. 
 
Proofs of Proposition 2 
 
1.1. General Setting 
 
We  analyze  the  case  of  2  CEOs.  We  assume  private  valuations  (the  CEO’s  valuations 
obtained from Proposition 1) and risk-averse CEOs (consistent with Section 1). CEO i is the 
bidder of interest. He has made past acquisitions. CEO j is the rival bidder. We assume that he has 
not done previous acquisitions. Past acquisitions are common knowledge. They generate learning, 
which translates into a right-shift of the CEO’s valuation distribution (an increase in mean, a 
direct consequence of Proposition 1). This is a case of conditional stochastic dominance (see 
Arozamena and Cantillon, 2004, definition 1).   
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Valuations are positively correlated.
21 We denote by  ) (.
*
* i v v F
j  the distribution of CEO  j’s 
valuation conditional on CEO i's valuation and assume that it is a continuous and differentiable 
function.  We  denote  ) (.
*
* i v v f
j   the corresponding density function. The positive statistical 
association between CEO valuations is captured by assuming that  ) (.
*
* i v v F
j   has increasing 
differences: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( : ,
* * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * i j v i j v i j v i j v i i j j v v F v v F v v F v v F v v v v
j j j j      
        (I.1) 
This increasing difference condition is equivalent to imposing that 
* * * ) ( j i j v v v F    is increasing 
in 
*
i v . In other words, the higher CEO i's valuation, the higher the rate at which the CEO j’s 
valuation is increasing. Conditional stochastic dominance implies first order stochastic dominance 
(FOSD): 
) (. ) (.
* *
* *
   i v j v v F v F
j i           (I.2) 
This amounts to the assumption that, despite positive correlation between CEOs’ valuations, the 
CEO who implements deals learns more than the CEO who does not. 
 
I.2. Tender Offers (ascending open auction) 
Equilibrium bidding function. By using classical game theory arguments, it is straightforward 
to show that the dominant strategy for each CEO is to bid up to his own valuation (recall that, in 
Section  1,  we  define  CEO’s  valuation  as  his  certainty-equivalent  of  the  target  value).  The 
arguments are as follows: 
                                                        
21 Since Milgrom and Weber (1982), the more general concept of affiliation has been introduced in auction 
theory to deal with statistically interdependent valuations. Positive correlation is a special case of affiliation 
(see Milgrom (2004), p. 137).   
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-  assume the CEO i chooses a bid b above his own value 
*
i v . If he looses the tender offer, 
his payoff is zero. If he wins, two cases are possible. Either he would also have won by 
bidding his valuation 
*
i v . In such a case, bidding b instead of 
*
i v  changes nothing (he 
wins in the two cases, he pays the same price). Or he wouldn’t have won by bidding his 
valuation 
*
i v . In such a case, he has to pay a price greater than his own valuation . He 
wins but, by the definition of the valuation, he gets a negative payoff; 
-  assume the CEO i chooses a bid b below his own valuation 
*
i v . If CEO j’s bid is such that 
CEO i wins the tender offer, since the price paid by CEO i is the price level at which 
CEO j quits, CEO i would have had the same payoff by bidding 
*
i v  instead of b. But, if 
the CEO j’s bid is between b and 
*
i v , the CEO i will loose the tender offer while he 
would have won by bidding 
*
i v  with a positive payoff. The CEO i is therefore worse off 
bidding b instead of 
*
i v . 
Irrespective of asymmetry, risk-aversion and correlated valuations, the equilibrium bidding 
strategy for bidder i is therefore simply to bid his valuation: 
* *) ( i i v v   .           (I.3) 
Note  that  this  equilibrium  bidding  strategy  is  a  dominant  strategy:  it  does  not  depend  on  the 
strategy adopted by rival bidders.  Thus, we  do not  have to  incorporate in  our static analysis 
potential optimal responses of rival bidders to a change of bidder i valuation. The equilibrium 
bidding function is clearly increasing in the CEO’s valuation.
22  
                                                        
22 Note that, even if the arguments developed here are the same as those used to prove the equivalence 
between the ascending open auction and the second-best price auction in an independent private value 
setup, this strategic equivalence does not extend to the case of N bidders with correlated valuations.  
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Expected ex-post observable price. The  ex-post observable price  is the price paid by the 
winner of the tender offer. To obtain its expected value, we have to integrate it over the valuation 
distribution of the losing bidder.  In the open ascending auction setup with two acquirers, it is the 
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Learning. Learning increases the CEO valuation (see Proposition 1). Using the Leibniz 
theorem, the derivative of the price function with respect to the CEO i valuation 
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By the increasing differences property of  ) (
* *
i j v v F  (see Equation (I.1)), the derivative of the 
price function with respect to CEO i’s valuation 
*
i v  is therefore positive: the ex-post observable 
price is an increasing function of the CEO’s valuation. It is interesting to note this average ex-post 
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: this effect is due to the increasing differences property of  ) (.
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* i v v F
j . 
Without a positive correlation between bidders’ valuations, it would have been equal to 
zero. 
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j : this effect represents new states of the world in which bidder i wins the 
auction, paying however a higher price. 
 
I.3. Private Auctions 
We now turn to the case of private auctions organized by financial intermediaries. Hansen 
(2001) provides an in-depth presentation of the institutional setting of such auctions. The key 
feature for our analysis is that these are usually sealed bid first-price auctions. They are very 
different from open ascending auctions. The first question that we analyze here, as in the case of 
the second price auction, is whether bids and price are strictly increasing in valuation as in the 
tender offers setup. A complication however arises from the fact that the equilibrium bidding 
strategies  are  interdependent.  Our  static  analysis  (the  effect  of  learning  on  average  ex-post 
observable prices) must therefore account the strategic behavior adjustments of rival bidders.  
Equilibrium bidding function. Asymmetric first price auctions are analyzed in Maskin and 
Riley (2000b). Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) extend the set of available results by providing a 
static analysis at equilibrium of asymmetry in procurement auctions context. Their results rely on 
conditional stochastic dominance of the cost distributions of bidders (the equivalent of Equation 
I.2 but stated in a procurement auctions context). As we limit ourselves to the case of two bidders, 
in the terminology of Maskin and Riley (2000b), bidder i is the strong bidder and bidder j is the 
weak bidder.  
Maskin and Riley  (2000b) do  not  explicitly  deal  with risk aversion and interdependence. 
However, assuming that the CEOs utility functions are log supermodular
23 and considering the 
interdependence between valuations and the private nature of valuations, Proposition 5 of Maskin 
                                                        
23  In  a  private -value  setup,  log  supermodulari ty  imposes  the  following  restriction: 




 , where  ) , (
*
i i v b   is the CEO i expected surplus.  
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and Riley (2000a) establishes the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a 
first-price  auction.  As  pointed  out  by  the  authors,  sufficient  conditions  for  the  log 
supermodularity of the utility function are that preferences are monotonic and exhibit either risk 
aversion  or  risk  neutrality.  Risk  aversion  is  assumed  here  and  monotonic  preferences  are  by 
construction since the CEO’s valuation is obtained by maximizing his expected utility (Section 
1.4). Note also that Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) clearly state that their results hold also under 
risk  aversion  and  that,  as  long  as  the  conditional  stochastic  dominance  condition  is  fulfilled 
(assumed here at Equation (1.2), consistently with respect to Propositon 1), their result remains 
valid.  
Following Maskin and Riley (2000b), denote by  ) , (
*
i i v b   CEO i’s expected surplus when 
he bids b and has valuation 
*
i v . The CEO i decision problem is then: 
 
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We first take the log to obtain: 
    )) ) ( ( log( ) log( Max   ) , ( log Max    
* 1 * *
* i j v i i b i b
v b F b v U v b
j
      ,   (I.7) 
and then differentiate with respect to b to obtain the following first order condition: 
0
)' ( ) ) ( (


























.       (I.8) 
Applying  the  same  development  to  CEO j, we  obtain the characterization  of the  equilibrium 
bidding functions in our setup (the equivalent of Equation (3.12) in Maskin and Riley (2000b)
24): 
for CEO i (strong bidder): 
                                                        
24 The boundary conditions emanating from the common range argument (equation (3.13) in Maskin and 
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for CEO j (weak bidder): 
) (
) ( '
)' ( ) ) ( (
























.         
Equation  (I.9)  characterizes  the  equilibrium  bidding  functions  of  CEO i and CEO j.  To 
ascertain whether they are increasing in their respective reservation values, one can appeal to the 
monotonic selection theorem (Milgrom (2004), Theorem (4.1)).   Assuming  log supermodular 
utility,  the  expected  surplus  function  ) , (
*
i i v b    satisfies  the  strict  single  crossing  difference 
conditions.
25  Therefore,  by  monotonic  selection,  the  CEOs’  equilibrium  bidding  functions 
) (
*
i i v    and  ) (
*
j j v    must  be  non-decreasing  in  their  respective  valuations.  It  remains  to  be 
proved that they are strictly increasing.  
Assume the contrary. Then, there would exist a range of reservation values 
*
i v  for which 
CEOs would offer a constant bid b; 
-  with some probability, ties would occur.
26  In case of ties, each of the two C EOs could 
win with probability one instead of probability ½ by increasing their bid by a small 
amount ε.  Since ε  (the cost  of  increasing the bid)  can be arbitrarily small, it  would 
always be profitable to increase the bid. 
                                                        
25  To see this, note that  0 ) ) , ( log (
* * 2     i i i v b v b  ,  which  is  the  constraint  imposed  by  the  log 
supermodularity assumption in a private value setup, is one of the sufficient conditions to insure that the 
single crossing difference condition is fulfilled (see Milgrom (2004), p. 100, condition (ii)). 
26 With continuous support of the reservation valuations, the probability of ties (
*
i v  = 
*
j v ) is zero but the 
probability that the valuations fall in the same range is strictly higher than zero.  
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-  ties are therefore incompatible with the equilibrium and the equilibrium bidding functions 
must be strictly increasing in the CEOs reservation values. 




i   the probability that bidder  i  (the  strong  bidder)  will  bid  below  b  in  equilibrium 
(computed using  ) (.
*
* j v v F
i ) and  ) (b pr
E
j  the corresponding probability that bidder  j (the weak 
bidder) will bid bellow b in equilibrium. The ex-post observable price conditional on winning for 
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The expected ex-post observable price conditional on winning for bidder i is therefore: 
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     (I.11) 
Equation (I.11) highlights that the expected ex-post price of the winning bidder aggregates two 
effects: 
-  the probability of winning:  ) ( i
E
j b pr ; 





i i b dpr b ) ( . 
Learning. Learning means, in our setup, a right-shift of the CEO valuation distribution. Let 
us denote  ) (.
~ *
* j v v F
i  the valuation distribution of CEO i after one more acquisition. By 
conditional stochastic dominance,  ) ( ) (
~ * *
* * j v j v v v F v v F
i i   for all v.  Proposition 1 in Arozamena 




i  : the equilibrium bidding distribution of 
                                                        
27 We add the E superscript to emphasize that we are dealing with equilibrium bid distribution.  
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the bidder who learns (and valuation increases) shift to the right. He bids more aggressively in 
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Everything  else  constant,  in  equilibrium,  learning  decreases  the  probability  of  an  ex -post 
observable low price: 
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I.3. Direct Negotiation 
Direct  negotiations  involve  bargaining  between  a  single  acquirer  and  a  single  target.  As 
pointed out in the introduction of Section 2, direct negotiations between parties are frequent in 
merger  deals.  Samuelson  (1984)  studies  optimal  bargaining  with  information  asymmetry.  He 
shows that a bidder facing informational asymmetry about the value of the good, will find it 
optimal to make a first and final offer. Hansen (1987) uses this insight to investigate the role of 
the payment medium in the context of M&As. We use here the same setup to explore bidding 
behavior (and the ex-post observable price consequences) of the CEO.  
Assuming that it is optimal for the acquiring CEO to make a first and final offer, we still need 
to  worry  about  the  source  of  information  asymmetry.    It  seems  natural  to  presume  that  the 
acquiring  CEO  is  uncertain  about  the  target  shareholders’  reserve  price.    We  denote  the 
distribution  of the target shareholders’ reserve price  by ) (
*
i v r F , using intentionally the same 
notation as for the distribution of competitors’ valuations in the two previous auction contexts 
discussed above. 
Equilibrium bidding function. In such a setup, the acquiring CEO i maximizes:  
 
59 
) ( ) ( Max











.        (I.9) 
As with sealed-bid first price auctions, taking the log and writing the first-order condition, we 




















.         (I.10) 
The  same  arguments  used  in  the  case  of  sealed-bid  first-price  auctions  still  hold.  The  utility 
function is assumed to be log supermodular. The CEO expected surplus therefore satisfies the 
single crossing difference conditions.  By monotonic selection, the CEO optimal bidding function 
is  non-decreasing  in  his  valuation.  Only  the  arguments  used  to  prove  the  strictly  increasing 
behavior of the optimal bidding function change. The intuition is as follows: 
-  assume the optimal bidding function is not strictly increasing. Then, there would exist a 
range of valuations 
*
i v  for which CEOs would offer a constant bid b; 
-  but,  over  this  range  of  constant  bids,  the  probability  of    doing  the  deal  is  constant 
while
*
i v  is  increasing. So, increasing by some ε the bid would be like buying partial 
insurance providing a higher probably of succeed in the deal. Since risk averse decision 
makers value positively insurance contracts, such a decision would have a positive impact 
on the expected surplus of the CEO. 
-  this is incompatible with optimality. The CEO bidding function must therefore be strictly 
increasing in 
*
i v . 
Learning and expected payment conditional on winning. There  is only  one active bidder.  
Consequently, there is no rival bidder from whom an equilibrium strategic adjustment should be 
taken into account.  It is enough to see that: 
-  optimal bids are increasing in 
*
i v ;  
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-  the  ex-post  observable  acquisition  price  (the  price  conditional  on  a  successful  deal 
attempt) is the acquirer’s bid.  
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Supplement J - Empirical issues 
 
The acquisition program effect 
 
Schipper  and  Thompson  (1983)  and  Malatesta  and  Thompson  (1985)  emphasize  that  the 
market reaction at the start of an acquisition program capitalize the anticipated wealth effects of 
the  whole program,  not just that of the  current single acquisition. Hence  market reactions to 
subsequent deal announcements are merely revisions of the initial anticipation and are affected 
only by the incremental information content. This acquisition program anticipation effect does not 
suggest any particular trend in the observed CAR from deal to deal (except that the CAR for the 
first deal should be larger – at least in absolute value – since it contains more information.)  So, if 
we adhere to the acquisition program anticipation effect, predictions about the CAR from deal to 
deal must be understood as predictions about the trend of anticipations revisions rather than about 
the trend of wealth effects per se.   
 
Ex-post Sample Selection Biases  
 
Although we have derived clear empirical implications of learning and hubris in Proposition 
3, empirical tests of the above predictions are subject to important difficulties.  Two of the most 
important are likely to be sample selection biases and errors-in-variables.  
Roll (1986) describes the potential impact of the winner’s curse and hubris on the ex-post 
observed abnormal returns. Our analysis suggests a second sample selection phenomenon; viz., 
we do not observe deals that would have been undertaken by dismissed CEOs.  These two biases 
work in opposite directions: 
-  as explained in Roll (1986), hubris-infected CEOs overbid and are subject to the winner’s 
curse.  Since we observe mainly those who consummate deals, we most probably observe 
a disproportionate number of over-optimistic CEOs.    
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-  conversely, CEOs who pay too much for targets are more likely to be fired.  Hence, a 
disproportionate number of surviving CEO’s are less likely to be hubris infected. 
Which of these two biases dominates?  The answer to this empirical question depends, inter 
alia, on the pressure of corporate control mechanisms (the convexity of  F S   in Section 1) and 
on the strength of hubris (the amplitude of the difference  s s    , 0 ˆ  ). 
 
Errors-in-variable issues 
Figure  3  –  Panels  A  and  C  reveal  an  errors-in-variable  problem.  The  sub-sample  of 
acquisition programs characterized by an initial positive CAR should include both rational CEOs 
(Panel A) and hubris-infected CEOs (Panel C). This mixture will weaken the ex-post empirically 
observable  consequences  of  learning,  as  the  ex-post  observable  trend  of  CAR  and  BTD  will 
depend on the relative proportion of rational and hubris-infected CEOs. Only the use of some 
exogenous instrument to identify hubris-infected CEOs could completely resolve this problem. 
A final comment: As highlighted in Panel C of Figure 3, the CAR for hubris-infected CEOs 
may  be  positive  at  the  beginning  of  the  M&A  program.  Then,  if  instead  of  learning,  CEOs 
become subject to even more hubris, one might observe the same patterns as in Panel A (for 
learning rational CEOs), but most probably with a smaller or even negative CAR.  Therefore, 
what is really unique to our learning setup are predictions of Panel B and C. They can not be 
generated by growing hubris or a shrinking investment opportunity set. The key to an empirical 
test is therefore to identify a subsample of CEOs that (i) destroy wealth at the first deal and (ii) 
are most likely hubris infected. 
 
 
 